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Abstract 
 
Experimental economists believe (and enforce the idea) that researchers should not 
employ deception in the design of experiments. This rule exists in order to protect a 
public good: the ability of other researchers to conduct experiments and to have 
participants trust their instructions to be an accurate representation of the game being 
played. Yet other social sciences, particularly psychology, do not maintain such a rule.  
We examine whether such a public goods problem exists by purposefully deceiving some 
participants in one study, informing them of this fact, and then examining whether the 
deceived participants behave differently in a subsequent study. We find significant 
differences in the selection of individuals who return to play after being deceived as well 
as (to a lesser extent) the behavior in the subsequent games, thus providing qualified 
support for the proscription of deception. We discuss policy implications for the 
maintenance of separate participant pools. 
 
Keywords: laboratory experimental methods; experimental economics; deception; 
psychology and economics; laboratory selection effects
                                                 
∗ The authors thank Jennifer Alix-Garcia, James Andreoni, Colin Camerer, Martin Dufwenberg, Dan 
Friedman, John List, George Loewenstein, Andreas Ortmann, Matthew Rabin, Uri Simonsohn, Richard 
Thaler, Roberto Weber, and seminar participants at UC Berkeley and the ESA 2006 meetings for useful 
discussions, and the Yale University Institute for Social and Policy Studies for funding.  Research 
assistance from Mark Borgschulte, Elysha Massatt, Scott Nelson, and David Owens is appreciated.  All 
errors remain our own.   2 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In two of the original experimental economics textbooks, Davis and Holt (1993) 
and Friedman and Sunder (1994), among others, proscribe the use of deception in 
experiments. The primary concern with deception is that many experimental laboratories 
use a common pool of participants. Thus, a public goods problem exists in which 
experiencing deception in one experiment may cause participants to react differently (and 
uncertainly) in future games with other researchers. Clearly, maintaining this “public 
good” involves trade-offs between benefits to the individual (ability to conduct 
experiments that require deception) and the group (maintaining a subject pool that is 
trained to believe that experiment instructions are truthful). As some research questions 
may be better answered by using deception, should we forgo the knowledge which could 
be acquired through such experiments in order to maintain a common pool of deception-
free participants? This concern warrants testing, and in this paper we determine the 
presence and extent of such sample contamination in a particular setting. 
Although we focus here on the particular issue of deception, the overall 
methodological question of understanding what we mean by “control” in the laboratory is 
important more generally. Levitt and List (2007) discuss the tradeoffs between the 
laboratory and the field, and specifically focus on how the manner in which individuals 
are selected and watched may alter their behavior. Deception is just one example of how 
a subject pool may be altered which may influence interpretation of later experiments. If 
a subject pool is entirely confident that the environment is deception-free, this may 
heighten “control” at the expense of reality. On the other hand, in the field one may have 
participants who are suspicious of deception in unknown ways (thus exhibiting less 
control, but more reality). This paper does not compare the field to the laboratory with 
respect to behavior in economic experiments. Instead we examine an important selection 
effect: does a singular experience in the laboratory affect the likelihood that different 
individuals return in a future month for another experiment run by a different researcher?   3 
Bonetti (1998) writes the first, and perhaps only, article arguing that deception 
should be allowed in experimental economics. He reviews the evidence from experiments 
in psychology and concludes that deception has a minimal effect on behavior. Two 
immediate, mainly philosophical, replies to Bonetti’s argument are Hey (1998) and 
McDaniel and Starmer (1998). Later, Ortmann and Hertwig (2002) conduct a thorough 
review of the evidence from experiments in psychology. They conclude that the 
experience of deception does affect participants’ expectations, suspicions, and future 
behavior. 
Here we give a brief overview of the different strands of the psychology literature 
looking either at the effects of suspicion of deception or the effects of past experiences 
with deception itself on different outcomes. A reader interested in more details should 
consult the review by Ortmann and Hertwig (2002). There is a rather large strand of 
literature in psychology looking at differences in behavior based on whether a participant 
admits to being suspicious of deception. Stricker, Messick, and Jackson (1967)—one of 
the seminal papers on this topic—find that subjects who admitted to suspecting deception 
in the experiment in which they participated conformed less (i.e. were less likely to agree 
to unreasonable propositions simply because other subjects agreed) than those who 
claimed not to suspect anything. The converse of this line of study is that which looks at 
whether subjects who have been deceived claim they will be suspicious of information 
given to them by experimenters in the future. Both Epley and Huff (1998) and Krupat and 
Garonzik (1994) find that deceived subjects anticipate being more suspicious in the 
future. There is a third line of literature looking at the effects on behavior of being 
warned before an experiment by the experimenter that the experiment “might” include 
misinformation, or of being informed by a confederate before the game that it actually 
does involve deception. This type of forewarning tends not to lead to changes in behavior 
(see Wiener and Erker (1986) for the first type of warning and Golding and Lichtenstein 
(1970) for the second) although there is some mixed evidence. 
The three areas of literature discussed above do not look at the direct effects of 
experiencing deception in one experiment on behavior in future experiments. These   4 
consequences are the principal motivation for the prohibition of deception in 
experimental economics and are the focus of this paper. There do exist a few experiments 
in psychology which attempt exactly this type of test, albeit with non-economic 
experiments such as personality tests and memory games.
1 Some of these papers find that 
experiencing deception leads to changes in behavior (Silverman, Shulman, and 
Wiesenthal 1970; Christensen 1977) while others do not (Fillenbaum 1966). Some find 
that past experiences with deception lead to changes in behavior when the first and 
second set of experiments are noticeably similar, but not when the experiments are 
dissimilar (Brock and Becker 1966; Cook et al 1970). 
There are many differences between the above psychological literature measuring 
the effects of experienced deception on play in future experiments and the setup in this 
paper. Some of the psychological experiments did not give the control group (those who 
were not deceived) any prior experimental experience (Silverman et al 1970). Other 
experiments subjected the control group to a very different experience than that 
experienced by the deceived (Christensen 1977). In contrast, in this paper, the initial 
treatment was almost identical for those who were deceived and those who were not.  
Additionally, in some of the psychological experiments, the first and second 
treatments were conducted immediately sequentially. After the participants took part in 
the first experiment, a different researcher walked into the room and claimed that he 
really needed more subjects and wondered if they might have time to participate in one 
more experiment being run next door (Brock & Becker 1966; Cook et al 1970; 
Christensen 1977). This is not the conventional method of subject recruitment. In the 
current paper, the initial and secondary experiments were separated by approximately 
three weeks, and the recruitment mechanism for both experiments used e-mail, a 
conventional approach. 
In almost all of these psychological experiments, the deception involved lying to 
the subjects about the purpose of the experiment. For example, subjects were given two 
poems by Robert Frost, were told that one was by Frost and one by a high school English 
                                                 
1 Ortmann and Hertwig (2002) discuss in detail nine papers which look at the effects of past deception on 
behavior in future experiments in section 3.2.2 of their paper. Here we focus on five of those studies.   5 
teacher, and were then asked to rate the merits of the two poems. After the experiment 
they were debriefed and told that both poems were actually by Frost and that the 
experiment was looking at how beliefs regarding authorship affected the rating of the 
poems. In another experiment participants were told to try to write down as many phone 
numbers as they could as quickly as possible. After doing so, they were told that 
excellence in writing phone numbers quickly was a sign of obsessive compulsive 
disorder. Then they were told to try again. After the experiment, they were told that 
excellence in writing phone numbers was not actually a sign of obsessive compulsion; 
rather the experimenter wanted to see if the participant would write fewer phone numbers 
after hearing that misinformation.  
Experimental economists tend not to implement this particular form of deception. 
One of the more common forms of deception used in economic experiments is deceiving 
the player with regards to the partner with whom he is matched. Weimann (1994), Blount 
(1995), Scharlemann et al (2002), Sanfey et al (2003), and Winter and Zamir (2005) all 
told players that their partners are humans, when in fact they are computers playing either 
predetermined or random strategies. Kim and Walker (1984) told subjects that they were 
playing a public goods game with many more individuals than was in fact the case, using 
a stochastic variable to approximate the contributions from the nonexistent players. Ball 
et al (2001) and Gibbons and Van Boven (2001) tell players that their partner is of a 
certain intelligence level or personality type. Although their partner is a human, not a 
computer, the type is generated artificially. This allows the researcher to test how 
subjects react to specific situations which may not arise naturally with high probability.  
Different types of deceit may lead to different contamination of subjects. In this 
paper, we focus on one specific type of deception, and the results may not be 
generalizable to all types of deception. Specifically, we deceived subjects as to the 
identity of their partner. We chose this type of deception because, from both 
conversations with experimental economists and the small literature in experimental 
economics using deception (mentioned in the previous paragraph), this seems to be the 
type of deception that economists are primarily interested in. We randomize subjects into   6 
a treatment group which experiences deception regarding the identity of their partner and 
a control group which participates in a similar experiment but with no deception. Then 
we measure the effects of deception on the sample selection of those who return to 
participate in further experiments, as well as on subjects’ behavior in those future 
experiments.  
 
2 Experimental Procedures 
 
2A Overall Setup 
 
The Xlab (experimental social science laboratory) of the University of California 
at Berkeley maintains two participant lists, consisting primarily of undergraduates but 
also a few graduate students as well as some staff members. One participant list does not 
maintain the no-deception rule; it is less active but is sometimes used by behavioralists in 
the business school.
2 The second participant list is used primarily by economists and 
maintains the no-deception rule. Occasionally, as in the present experiment, researchers 
are allowed to deceive subjects from the latter pool, who are then moved to the former. 
In all cases, potential subjects are recruited using a variety of methods, including 
mass emails (to class lists or student organizations), flyers posted around campus, and 
booths at student and staff activity fairs. Subjects must actively choose to join the list, 
which then makes them eligible to receive announcements regarding (and to subsequently 
sign up for) specific experimental sessions. There are approximately six to ten unique 
experiments and concomitant e-mail announcements in a given month. 
Our first round of experiments involved 261 subjects across ten sessions, each of 
which lasted for approximately one hour. Five of these sessions involved deception 
(treatment) while five did not (control). The three initial sessions were necessarily 
control, so that we could use that data to program the computer players, but after that 
sessions were randomized as to treatment or control. Subjects signed a consent form and 
                                                 
2 The psychology department maintains a separate pool, although it is entirely possible for a subject to be 
on both the Xlab list and the psychology list.   7 
were given a written instruction sheet (see Appendix A), which was then read aloud by 
the researcher. The experiment itself was conducted on laptop computers implementing a 
z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments) program. When all 
subjects had completed the experiment, payoffs were determined and subjects waited 
approximately 15 minutes for individual checks to be filled out and distributed. 
In the non-deception treatment (five sessions, 132 subjects), subjects were 
randomly assigned to roles and matched with one another, and payoffs were determined 
according to actual play. (The actual games are described in detail below.) In the 
deception treatment (five sessions, 129 subjects), subjects were randomly assigned to 
roles, but in all cases their opponents’ actions were determined by a computer program 
that simulated the human play.
3,4 During the check-processing wait time, these subjects 
were informed that they had been deceived and that they had actually been partnered with 
a computer rather than with another human. They were told that this was necessary for 
the research (but no more specific details) and were asked to sign a second consent form 
allowing their data to be used. All subjects signed this consent form. 
Two to three weeks later, all subjects from the first round were sent a recruitment 
email for new experimental sessions using the name of a researcher different from that in 
the first round. This email was identical to the standard Xlab recruitment email, except 
that it promised $10 above and beyond the normal earnings in order to facilitate sufficient 
return rates. Subjects did not know that only they had received this particular email, 
although it is possible that some of them checked with friends and noticed that it had not 
gone out to the entire pool. However, that in itself is not an uncommon occurrence given 
various screening criteria used by other researchers at the lab. 
In all, 142 people returned for one of the eight sessions that took place three to 
four weeks after the sessions in round one. These lasted slightly under an hour, and each 
                                                 
3 We explain this in more detail in the next section. 
4 If we were only interested in the results from the first round of experiments, it may have been possible to 
use a technique suggested by Bardsley (2000) which avoids deception while at the same time maintains a 
setup in which players who think their partner is a human are actually partnered with a computer. Using 
this technique, though, would not allow us to measure the effects of being deceived on return rates and play 
in subsequent experiments.   8 
consisted of a mixture of both deceived and non-deceived subjects. A different researcher 
than in the first round was physically present in the room for these sessions. Subjects 
signed a standard consent form, were given the instructions, and then completed the 
experiment as three separate interactions on the VeconLab website. 
Afterward, as they waited to be paid, they were informed that these sessions were 
in fact a continuation of the previous experiment, and they were asked to sign another 
consent form allowing use of their data. For those from the deception treatment, this was 
thus the fourth informed consent form that they signed in the course of the full protocol. 
None of the participants refused to give their consent at any point throughout the 
experiments. 
 
2B. Specific games 
 
In our first set of sessions, we ran a trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
1995) with a $20 endowment to the trustor.
5 The trustor chose an amount (the 
‘investment’) to send to the trustee, and this amount was then tripled. The trustee then 
returned as much or as little as desired. There were two practice rounds and four actual 
rounds. Anonymous partners were randomly chosen and maintained for all six rounds 
(and, like everything else above, subjects were told that this would be the case), but 
individuals were not told the identity of their partner at any point. No communication in 
the room was allowed. 
One of the four actual rounds was randomly chosen to determine payoffs. All 
subjects were given an additional $5 to make sure that no one received a final payout of 
$0, so the potential individual range (for both roles) was $5-$65. In fact, players in both 
roles sometimes received $5 (i.e. $0 in the game itself), and some trustees received $65. 
We ran three non-deception sessions first and used those to program the computer 
play in the deception sessions in order for it to match the human play as closely as 
                                                 
5 Despite evidence suggesting that the first player in the Trust game is not merely acting due to “trust” but 
also due to a desire to take risks (Karlan 2005, Schechter 2006), we use the canonical terminology here of 
“trustor” and “trustee.”   9 
possible. Since these were repeated games, we needed to try to mimic the entire strategy, 
not simply the observed play-paths. Obviously this was imperfect, but in the end we 
categorized trustors into five types, and trustees into three types. A small percentage of 
trustors never invested more than $5 of their endowment in any round, while a significant 
fraction invested $20 every time. We also included a “trigger strategy” for all types of 
trustors (as observed in the real subjects): if the trustee ever sent back less than what was 
invested, the trustor never again invested anything. The results section below outlines the 
summary statistics showing that the actual game play by participants in the deception and 
non-deception treatments is not significantly different. 
In our second set of sessions, which occurred three to four weeks after the first 
session, we ran three different games with each subject. All games were run with subjects 
simultaneously connected to the VeconLab website at the University of Virginia. The 
three decision problems were run as independent sequential online sessions, since the 
type of game was different in each case. All instructions were provided on the website 
under the game selection categories of Bargaining and Fairness / Bargaining Games; 
Individual Decision Problems / Lottery Choice Menu; and Game Theory Experiments / 
2x2 Matrix Games, respectively.  
The first game was a dictator game with an endowment of $20 (i.e. subjects chose 
how much of this amount to give away to an anonymous partner). All subjects played the 
role of sender (and therefore, in effect, also the role of potential receiver), but for payoffs 
only half of the matchings were consummated, so that each subject ended up as either 
sender or receiver but not both. 
The second “game” was a series of gambles (Holt and Laury 2002), with ten 
ordered binary choices between two lotteries. The exact payoffs are shown in Appendix 
Table A. The first choice was between a (safe) lottery that paid $11 with 10% chance and 
$8.80 with 90% chance and a (risky) lottery that paid $21.20 with 10% chance and $0.55 
with 90% chance. Here the first lottery was risk-dominant and also had a significantly 
higher expected value. As the choices progressed, the probability of the higher payoff in   10  
each lottery increased by 10%, until the final choice was between $11 (with certainty) 
versus $21.20 (with certainty), so that the second lottery dominated in all respects. 
  In the third game, subjects played a prisoner’s dilemma with payoffs (C,C) = 
(10,10); (D,D) = (6,6); and (D,C) = (15,1). They were randomly assigned to be the row or 
column player and were randomly matched with one another. No deception was involved 
for any of the games in these sessions. Finally, one of the three games was randomly 
chosen to determine payoffs. (In the risk game, which involved multiple decisions, one 
decision was randomly chosen.) We also paid each player $10 in addition to their 
earnings from the games (as promised in the recruitment email). 
  These three games were chosen in part because they are so common in the field 
and laboratory, and in part because previous research has suggested that subjects behave 
differently in the dictator game and in the prisoners’ dilemma when they think their 
partner is a human versus when they think their partner is a computer. Our hypothesis 
was that players who had been deceived in the past as to the identity of their partner 
would be suspicious in subsequent experiments that their partner was actually a 
computer, even when we told them they were playing with a human.  
  There is evidence that, in the prisoners’ dilemma, players cooperate more often 
when they are playing with another human than they do when playing with a computer 
(Abric and Kahan 1972, Kiesler et al 1996, Rilling et al 2004). Thus, we hypothesized 
that those players who had been deceived in the past would suspect they might be playing 
against a computer and so would cooperate less often in the prisoners’ dilemma. Frohlich, 
Oppenheimer, and Moore (2001) find that players in a dictator game who suspect that 
they were not paired with real people give less. Thus, we also hypothesized that players 
who had been deceived would keep more as dictator in the dictator game. We included 
the Holt-Laury sequence of risky lotteries as a control, our hypothesis being that those 
who were deceived would not play any differently than those who were not deceived, as 
it did not involve a partner (unless they believed that part of the deception was our lying 
about the results of random draws). 
   11  
3 Results 
 
As there were 261 participants who participated in the first round and 142 in the 
second round, our sample size is somewhat small when compared with some studies of 
selection effects. This may make it more difficult to find statistically significant results. 
On the other hand, adding more participants would have meant deceiving even more 
subjects. Before conducting this research we did not know how large an effect deception 
might have on the participants and so were conservative in our recruiting. A second 
potential drawback of the data is that in the Xlab no demographic information was 
universally collected other than sex and the number of experiments in which the 
participant had previously participated.  
Before looking to see if being deceived in a previous experiment affects play in a 
subsequent experiment, we would like to make sure that both the randomization and the 
deception were successful. Remember, the first round of our experiment involved six 
rounds of a trust game. The senders who were deceived (not deceived) sent on average 
$14.11 ($12.88) in the first round, $11.68 ($9.95) in the last round, and an average of 
$14.59 ($13.33) in all six rounds. Using a t-test with equal variance, the t-values are 
1.041, 1.160, and 1.281 respectively. The receivers who were deceived (not deceived) 
returned 0.435 (0.438) of what they had received in the first round, 0.186 (0.174) in the 
last round, and on average 0.413 (0.407) in all rounds. The t-values for these tests are 
0.095, 0.261, and 0.318 respectively. Males make up 37% of the deceived population and 
42% of the non-deceived population, yielding a t-value of -0.858. Since none of these 
differences is significant the randomization appears to have been successful.
6 
 
3A Effect of Deception on Selection into Subsequent Experiment 
 
                                                 
6 Psychologists believe there may be "faithful subjects" who attempt to take the experiment at face value, 
even if he suspects deception. Hence, the fact that the deceived and non-deceived play no differently in the 
initial experiment could be a sign that the deceived do not suspect the deception or that they are merely 
being “faithful.”   12  
  The next step in our analysis involves looking at the effect of deception on return 
rates. As described above, all subjects were invited to participate in another round of 
experiments approximately three weeks after the first round. Subjects were not led to 
believe that this subsequent experiment was in any way related to the previous 
experiments. Only 55% of the original participants returned for the second round of 
experiments. 
  Table 1 shows that 51 percent of those who were deceived returned while 58 
percent of those who were not deceived returned and that this difference is not 
statistically significant. While the subjects were not living in a vacuum during the three 
weeks between the first and second set of experiments, because of the randomization we 
only need to assume that these two groups had, on average, similar experiences in the 
time between the two experiments.  
Interestingly, gender differences played a significant role in our analysis: females 
who have been deceived are significantly less likely to return than females in the control 
group. On the other hand, males who were deceived are significantly more likely to 
return than males in the control group. In results not shown here, we tested for return 
status based on the number of previous experiments at the Xlab in which the player 
participated. Although participants who have participated in other experiments in the past 
are significantly more likely to return in general, the deception effect does not differ for 
the more or less experienced. 
The next few rows of Table 1 examine further selection effects. We look at return 
rates dividing the sample into four categories: “High Passers” and “Low Passers,” and 
Player As (trustors) and Player Bs (trustees).
7 We find no significant differences within 
three of these four groups. Only “Low Passer, Player B” types seemed to be influenced 
by the deception in their decision to return. One possible explanation for this is that after 
the untrustworthy (i.e. the “Low Passers”) found out that they were deceived, they felt 
more self-conscious about their behavior.  
                                                 
7 A player is a “High Passer” if he passed at least half of what he could pass, and a “Low Passer” otherwise. 
When categorizing players as high or low passers we ignore play in the last round of the trust game. Since 
many Player As passed no money in the last round, making it impossible to calculate the share returned by 
Player B in that round, this also allows us to include more observations.    13  
One could worry that, in making multiple comparisons, a few of them are bound 
to appear significant when in fact there are no true differences. We employ a Bonferonni 
correction for multiple significance tests in order to correct the significance of 
independent comparisons and derive conservative estimates for these non-independent 
comparisons. Given our correlated outcomes, the Bonferonni correction may hold each 
test to an unreasonably high standard and increase the probability of a Type II error. Still, 
it is interesting to see which, if any, of our comparisons will stand up to the Bonferonni 
correction. In Table 1, only one comparison remains significant (at the 5% significance 
level) after making the Bonferonni correction, and that is the fact that deceived females 
are less likely to return to participate in the second set of experiments. 
  In Table 2, we look at selection effects not based on how the player himself 
played, but rather on how his partner treated him, or on the round of the trust game that 
was randomly chosen to count for payoffs. When we compare return rates conditional on 
the play of the partner we find that, for the sub-sample of Player Bs who were sent very 
little by Player A, being deceived made them less likely to return. Thus, it seems that 
deception most influenced the individual’s decision to return to the laboratory when he 
also was not lucky in the game. (Recall that Player B had no endowment. If Player A sent 
him very little, then he went home with very little.) Clearly, then, it was not merely the 
experience of deception that altered the future decision, but rather deception coupled with 
low winnings.   
This is further reinforced by the final two rows of Table 2. Here we examine the 
effect of the deception treatment on those whose payoffs were determined by the final 
round of the Trust game. We had randomly chosen which round of the Trust game 
determined payoffs. Earnings in the final round, presumably due to backwards induction, 
were significantly lower than in the previous rounds. There is no difference in overall 
return rates for those players for whom the last round determined their earnings as 
opposed to those for whom an earlier round determined earnings. We find that players 
who were deceived, and for whom the last round of the trust game counted, were much   14  
less likely to return. (We should note that none of the comparisons in Table 2 stand up to 
the Bonferonni correction.)  
Summarizing Table 2: being deceived made individuals less likely to return only 
when they were unlucky insofar as having received a low payout. Perhaps these players 
felt that not only did we deceive them in terms of the identity of their partner, but that we 
may have also deceived them either in terms of purposely choosing to pay them for the 
round with the lowest payoffs or by programming the “trustor” computer to send them 
very little. (This, of course, was not the case.) One could argue that it might not be the 
experience of deception per se that encouraged these ‘unlucky’ players not to return; they 
may have felt that the procedures in the experiment were unjust and not have returned for 
that reason. For more on this, refer to Thibaut and Walker (1975), whose seminal work 
on procedural justice finds that, holding the outcome constant, satisfaction depends upon 
the process by which outcomes are reached. 
 
 3B Effect of Deception on Play in a Subsequent Experiment 
 
  Next, we analyze whether deception has an effect on play in future experiments. 
We preface these results with the caveat that we cannot differentiate in practice between 
any indirect selection effects and direct deception effects. If all participants came back to 
play in the second round of experiments, we could claim that any differences in play were 
due to the direct effect of having experienced deception. Since only 55% of the 
participants came back for the second round, any differences in play in the second set of 
experiments may be due to a change in behavior at the individual level after experiencing 
deception: a player who was deceived once begins to second-guess the experimenter and 
uses a different strategy than he would otherwise. However, differences in behavior may 
also be due to the selection effect: a player who was deceived once may play no 
differently in future experiments, but only certain types of players may decide to return 
after having been deceived. Although we cannot separate the indirect and direct effects,   15  
the combination of the two makes up the true effect on subsequent experimental 
outcomes, which is the practical outcome of interest. 
  Table 3 presents these results. We measure four outcomes: (1) the amount kept in 
the dictator game; (2) risk aversion from the Holt-Laury gambles (if consistent); (3) a 
binary variable if responses to the risk aversion questions were inconsistent; and (4) 
defection in the prisoners’ dilemma. We analyze the results for the sample as a whole, as 
well as for (a) inexperienced versus experienced participants; (b) males versus females; 
and (c) those who took on the role of Player A versus Player B in the first round.  
  Lastly, we make an attempt at controlling for selection. We saw previously that 
those players who were deceived and unlucky (either because their payoffs were decided 
by the last round of the trust game, or because they were a trustee who received very little 
from their trustor) were less likely to return than those who were not deceived and 
unlucky.  By limiting our analysis to only ‘lucky’ players, we can look specifically at the 
group of players exhibiting less selection. 
  The top left quadrant of Table 3 shows the primary results for the full sample. We 
show via a t-test that mean behavior of the deceived is different from the non-deceived. 
We also carry out Levene’s test comparing the variance of behavior of the deceived to 
that of the non-deceived. For the results on variance we look only at the amount kept in 
the dictator game and at the number of safe choices in the Holt-Laury risk game. We do 
not compare the variances of the two binary outcome variables. One might imagine there 
to be more noise in the actions of the deceived because they may believe that their actions 
are less likely to map into payoffs. 
As can be seen, we find that the deceived individuals were more likely to behave 
inconsistently in the risky gambles, and we find no significant differences in the other 
three outcomes. For the Holt-Laury risk lotteries, we find no differences in risk aversion 
either in the full sample or in any sub-sample analysis (except for those who were 
‘lucky’).  However, eight percent of the players did not make consistent choices and were 
categorized as “switchers,” and we do find a difference for these individuals. Remember, 
the Holt-Laury experiment involves a series of choices between a risky and safe option.   16  
As one moves along in the series, the risky option becomes more and more appealing. A 
rational player should not switch back and forth between the risky and safe options, but 
rather switch from the safe option to the risky one at one and only one point. 
If we compare the risk aversion of the players who played consistently, there is no 
difference, as we expected, between those who were deceived and those who were not. 
The measure of risk-aversion in Table 3 is the number of safe choices, which could 
hypothetically range from 0 to 10, with higher values representing more risk aversion. 
Using Levene’s test for equality of variance, in the full sample we find that the variance 
for the deceived is significantly higher than for the non-deceived at the 5% level. The 
variances are also significantly different for all player Bs at the 10% level, for all players 
and player Bs who had participated in at least 10 previous experiments (at the 5% level), 
and for all females (at the 10% level). The variances of the amount kept in the dictator 
game are not significantly different in any of the comparisons.  
We also find that significantly more of the deceived players are “switchers”; it is 
possible that they no longer take the research seriously, and thus switch back and forth 
between the risky and safe choices. This result is quite significant among the general 
population of players, as well as among females and the more inexperienced 
participants.
8 Using the Bonferonni correction within panels of Table 3, the only finding 
which remains significant at the 10% level is that deceived females are more likely to 
play inconsistently in the Holt-Laury gamble.
9 
  In the dictator game, we find no significant effect of previous deception on the 
amount kept in the pooled sample. We do find, however, that those who played as trustor 
in the first round and were deceived kept significantly more as dictator than did Player As 
who were not deceived. Further analysis shows that this result holds for both the 
inexperienced Player As (i.e. who had participated in fewer than 10 previous experiments 
                                                 
8 There is also one player who chose all 10 safe lotteries. As the tenth lottery gives 100% probability to the 
higher of the two payoffs, and the high payoff is higher for the risky choice, no rational player should 
choose all 10 safe lotteries. The player who did this had also been deceived (although we do not consider 
this player to be a switcher). 
9 Note that this effect, albeit significant statistically, is small in terms of the proportion of individuals who 
answer inconsistently in either the deceived or undeceived pool.   17  
in the Xlab) and female Player As. For the prisoners’ dilemma, we find no difference in 
behavior among those who were deceived versus those who were not (except that females 
were almost significantly more likely to defect if deceived).  
  In panel F we look only at the ‘lucky’ players, focusing attention on the group of 
players that exhibits less selection. Within this group of players, we still find that players 
who experienced deception are more likely to play inconsistently in the risk game. On the 
other hand, there are no differences in play in the dictator game or the prisoners’ dilemma 
within this group of people. This gives suggestive evidence that the difference in 
behavior in the risk game, which does not involve a partner, is not due to selection, but 
rather to the effect of experiencing deception. On the other hand, any differences in 
behavior in the dictator game and prisoners’ dilemma, games which do involve partners, 
may be due to selection. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
We find that deception influences both the selection of experiment participants as 
well as their behavior. Specifically, we find that females are less likely to return after 
being deceived, and that those who fare badly due to luck and are deceived are less likely 
to return than those who fare badly due to luck and are not deceived. Regarding behavior 
for those who return, we find an increase in the likelihood of answering risk aversion 
questions inconsistently and an increase in the variance of the number of safe gambles 
chosen for those who do answer consistently. We suggest that this is evidence of not 
taking the games seriously.
10 We also find that Player As, especially those who are either 
female or inexperienced, kept more of their money in the dictator game in the second 
round. 
We have discussed these results with both psychologists and economists and are 
struck by their reactions: both see the data as supporting their priors!  Perhaps this should 
                                                 
10 An alternative explanation is selection: those who did not fully understand the deception and why it 
mattered are more likely to return, and such individuals are also less likely to understand the risk aversion 
questions.   18  
come as no surprise, given what we know about confirmation bias (Lord, Ross, and 
Lepper 1979).   We fully understand that, although we do find clear differences in 
behavior, they are subject to interpretation as to their economic (or psychological) 
importance, as well as to further refinement regarding their magnitude and 
generalizability.  The irony is that further study of how deception influences behavior, 
both in the laboratory and in the real world, requires relaxing the no-deception rule. 
  In one sense, all we have shown is that prior experiences in life influence the way 
individuals play games in a laboratory, and that experience in the laboratory is a part of 
real life (and hence influences later behavior). An opponent of the no-deception rule 
might argue that deception is no different than other such (uncontrollable) experiences, 
which must simply be assumed to be orthogonal to the treatments of interest. However, 
experimental deception is in fact controllable and, as we have demonstrated, has some 
non-random effects on behavior in the types of treatments that interest experimental 
economists. At the very least, since prior exposure to deception is potentially knowable 
information to researchers, it should be accounted for when possible. 
  Another possibility is that it may be necessary to deceive subjects in order to 
convince them that they have not been deceived.
11 This is perhaps most evident when 
dealing with probabilities, where people tend to have strong and incorrect preconceived 
notions. For instance, it is well known that individuals underestimate the number of long 
strings of either heads or tails in a sequence of random coin-flips, so when presented with 
a truly random sequence they may well become suspicious upon observing an extended 
sequence of one outcome. Slightly more subtly, if an experiment involves a very small 
probability of some extreme event, subjects may doubt the researcher if it ever does occur 
(especially if this entails a negative outcome for the subject). This provides an incentive 
to ensure that such extreme events never happen. 
Lastly, one further point should be made: all we have shown is that those who 
were deceived behave differently than those who were not, primarily in terms of return 
rates. If deception is deemed rampant in the real world, are we better off testing behavior 
                                                 
11 Thanks go to Matthew Rabin for suggesting this line of reasoning.   19  
in a sterile, deception-free environment? Or would we get more widely relevant results if 
individuals were suspicious of the administrators, just as they may be in the real world 
with respect to economic transactions? To the extent that we want to use laboratory 
experiments to infer real world behavior, merely finding that deceived individuals behave 
differently than non-deceived individuals does not tell us which pool behaves more 
similarly in a lab to how they would in their natural environment. These issues are drawn 
out in more detail in Levitt and List (2007), which discusses the link between the 
laboratory and the real world, and how issues such as those discussed here influence the 
interpretability of laboratory experiments. 
  The debate in the deception literature thus far has been pursued at a philosophical 
level (something to which economists are not often accustomed), rather than as a cost-
benefit analysis (something to which economists are accustomed).
12 This paper identifies 
some of the costs, but does not address the benefits. The benefits clearly accrue from the 
research questions that would remain unanswered because of a proscription on deception. 
Maintaining separate subject pools, conceivably with a higher rate paid for access to 
unadulterated subjects, might be one way to address this issue. 
Ortmann and Hertwig (2001) discuss four characteristics of experimental 
economics which are not used by experimental psychologists, one of which is the 
proscription of deception. They argue that psychologists can learn from economists’ 
practices. Roth (2001) replies that the public costs to deception may be lower for 
psychologists than they are for economists. Even if psychologists were to stop using 
deception as an experimental tool today, students would continue to be taught about 
research that used deception. Thus, participants in psychological experiments may remain 
suspicious for many years. Since economists have maintained the reputation of 
eschewing deception, the costs of deception carried out by a few researchers in 
economics may be higher for the profession as a whole. The effect of deception on non-
deceived participants is even harder to measure. Those who have not yet been deceived 
                                                 
12 For instance, some academics pose ethical considerations as reason for this rule. We suggest this is the 
role for the human subjects review boards at universities, not for one subfield of one discipline to decide 
independently of the rest of academe. See Friedman and Sunder (1994) for more discussion on this.   20  
may talk to deceived participants or hear about experiments using deception in their 
economics classes, thus tainting their perceptions of experimentation.
13 If these spillover 
effects are truly large, it may suggest that the maintenance of a “deception-free” 
participant list is not enough to limit the effects of deception on experimental outcomes. 
 
                                                 
13 Henrich (2001) makes the argument that this reputational spillover will be of lesser importance if 
experimentalists use subjects who are not students.   21  
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Appendix A 
Experimental Instructions, Round One: 
 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making and thank you for being here.  You will 
be compensated for your participation in the experiment, though the exact amount you 
will receive will depend on the choices you and others make, and on random chance (as 
explained below).  Please pay careful attention to these instructions, as a significant 
amount of money is at stake.   
 
Information about the choices that you make during the experiment will be kept strictly 
confidential.  Your name will appear only on the payment-receipt form and will not be 
linked to any specific choices you make.  You will not be asked to reveal your identity or 
the content of your decisions to anyone else (either the experimenter or other 
participants) at any time during or after the experiment.  In order to maintain privacy and 
confidentiality, please do not speak to anyone during the experiment and please do not 
discuss your choices with anyone even after the conclusion of the experiment.   
 
In this experiment each of you will be paired with somebody else who is in this room. 
You will not be told who that person is either during or after the experiment. Half of you 
will be assigned to the role of Player A and half of you will be assigned to the role of 
Player B. Each person playing the role of A will be assigned $20 to begin the experiment. 
Those assigned the role of A (henceforth Player A) will have the opportunity to send 
some, all, or none of their $20 endowment to a player playing the role of B (henceforth 
Player B). Each dollar sent to Player B will be tripled. For example, if Player A sends $4, 
Player B will receive $12. If Player A sends $18, Player B will receive $54. Player B will 
then decide how much money (if any) to send back to Player A and how much money (if 
any) to keep.  
 
You will play this game in its entirety six times (or rounds).  You will remain with the 
same partner and role for all six rounds.   The first two rounds are just for practice so that   26  
you learn the rules of the game. The next four rounds will be used to determine the 
payouts.  In the end, one of these last four rounds will be chosen at random to determine 
you and your partner’s payouts according to your payoff in that round.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1, below, illustrates the sequence.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. One complete Round.   
 
The earnings of A and B are given by: 
A's earnings =       20     -     [what (s)he gives to B]     +     [what (s)he receives from B] 
B's earnings =     [3 times what (s)he has been given by A]    -  [what (s)he returns to A] 
 
Your role (A or B) will be told to you before the experiment starts.  You will play this 
role in all subsequent rounds. 
 
After all participants have made their choices in the first round, you will receive 
information about your earnings. Then you will play again and you will receive 
information about your earnings again. After the two practice rounds, you will play four 
more times. One of these last four rounds will be chosen at random to decide your actual 
payoffs.  The dollar amount in that round, plus a $5 show-up bonus, will be the amount 
you are paid for your participation in the experiment.   
 
Once the experiment begins please remain silent and in your seat until it is over. 
PLAYER A => SEND between $0 and $20 to B.
  
PLAYER B => RECEIVE triple what A sent.   
  
PLAYER B => SEND back some, none or all of new total to Player A.     27  
Computer Program Description 
To make your decisions you will use the computer in front of you. Right now, you can 
see an initial waiting screen. The program will be activated when the instructions are 
finished. 
 
Once the program is activated, you will go through two practice rounds to make certain 
that you correctly understand how the experiment will work.  These practice rounds will 
be numbered “-1” and “0.” When we start, a new window will pop up and replace the 
initial waiting window. If you are Player A, the new window will resemble the one 
shown below.  In this case, the upper-left of the screen informs you that you are in the 
first of 4 Rounds. The upper-right of the screen shows the time in which you are 
encouraged to make your decision. After you have completed the practice rounds, the 
experiment will begin. The rounds that determine your payoffs will be numbered “1” 
through “4.” The center of the screen will inform you that you are in round 1 and, if you 
are Player A, ask you for your decision.  If you are Player B you will be asked to wait for 
the other player to make their choice. You may choose any discrete amount between 
$0.00 and your full endowment ($20.00 in the case of player A.)  Your choice will be 
rounded to the nearest penny.     28  
 
 
 
After Player A makes his (or her) decision, Player B will be given the option of sending 
some, all or none of his (or her) money back to Player A.  The computer will display the 
screen below: 
 
   29  
 
 
In this case, Player B would be able to send back any amount (s)he wants to Player A. 
Player B can choose to send “$0.00,” “$15.00” or any number in between.  Player A will 
view a waiting screen while Player B makes their decision.     30  
 
 
  Finally, you will be shown the results of the round, including your payout and a 
summary of the choices you and the other player made.  Player A’s screen is shown 
above.  Player B will view a similar screen. You can click OK, or wait until the “Time 
Remaining” expires, at which point you will automatically progress to the next screen.   
  Then, the next round will start.  You will continue to play the role of Player A or 
B, and your partner will not change.  Your final payout for your time here will be chosen 
randomly from the four non-practice rounds, so you will want to pay attention throughout 
the experiment. 
  After the last round is finished, please sit quietly while we process the results and 
issue your payment.  You may go to the bathroom, work on homework or read during this 
period, which should last between 10 and 20 minutes.  
  At no point in the experiment will you be told who your partner is, nor will we 
identify you to your partner.  There are no right or wrong choices in this experiment.   31  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 
 
Player A starts with $20.  She sends $15. 
 
Player B receives $45, and sends back $30. 
 
  HOW MUCH does each player have at the end of the round? 
 
 
Rules 
 
  Please do not talk with anyone during the experiment. We ask everyone to remain 
silent through the end of the last round. 
  Your participation in the experiment and any information about your earnings will 
be used solely for research purposes. Your name and association to your decisions will be 
kept strictly confidential.  If you have any remaining questions about the confidentiality 
agreement you will be given a chance to ask in just a minute.     
  We ask that you assist us in maintaining the integrity of the experiment.  If at all 
possible, please do not discuss the experiment, your choices in it, or the outcomes with 
anyone, either during the experiment, or after you leave the Xlab.  
 
Questions 
 
  Any clarification questions should be asked at this time. Please raise your hand 
and wait for a researcher to come to your desk. If you need to use the bathroom, please do 
so before the start of the experiment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total Not Deceived Deceived
t-stat:
diff≠0
Proportion Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.547 0.583 0.512 1.162
(0.031) (0.043) (0.044)
261 132 129
Proportion of Males who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.558 0.482 0.646 -1.682*
(0.049) (0.067) (0.071)
104 56 48
Proportion of Females who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.541 0.658 0.432 2.895***
(0.040) (0.055) (0.055)
157 76 81
Proportion of "High Passers" (Player A) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.490 0.471 0.510 -0.393
(0.050) (0.071) (0.071)
102 51 51
Proportion of "Low Passers" (Player A) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.724 0.800 0.643 0.927
(0.084) (0.107) (0.133)
34 47
Proportion of "High Passers" (Player B) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.533 0.500 0.588 -0.564
(0.075) (0.096) (0.123)
45 28 17
Proportion of "Low Passers" (Player B) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.538 0.655 0.444 1.706*
(0.062) (0.090) (0.084)
65 29 36
Table 1: Selection Effects in Round Two (Based on Player Characteristics)
Mean, Standard Errors and Number of Observations
Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. A player is a “High Passer” if they passed at
least half of what they could pass in the Trust game, and a “Low Passer” otherwise.Total Not Deceived Deceived
t-stat:
diff≠0
Proportion of "High Receivers" (Player A) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.500 0.464 0.528 -0.497
(0.063) (0.096) (0.084)
64 28 36
Proportion of "Low Receivers" (Player A) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.556 0.586 0.520 0.480
(0.068) (0.093) (0.102)
54 29 25
Proportion of "High Receivers" (Player B) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.505 0.549 0.452 0.922
(0.052) (0.070) (0.078)
93 51 42
Proportion of "Low Receivers" (Player B) who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.676 0.867 0.545 2.117**
(0.078) (0.091) (0.109)
37 15 22
Proportion of Players "Whose Actual Payout Was Not Determined by Last Round” who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.565 0.568 0.562 0.090
(0.037) (0.051) (0.053)
184 95 89
Proportion of Players “Whose Actual Payout Determined by Last Round” who Returned to the Lab in Round Two 0.506 0.622 0.400 1.967*
(0.057) (0.081) (0.078)
77 37 40
Table 2: Selection Effects in Round Two (Based on Player Experience)
Mean, Standard Errors and Number of Observations
Standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Player A is referred to as a "High Receiver" if Player B sent back at least as half as much
as he received in the Trust game. Player B is referred to as a "High Receiver" if their Player A passed at least half of what they could pass. The final two rows divide the sample into those
whose payout was determined by the last round, and those whose payout was determined by any other round. Many passed zero back in the final round, since the final round was pre-
announced. Thus, those whose last round was chosen as the actual round earned on average less money.Not 
Deceived Deceived
t-stat:
mean 
diff≠0
Levene 
test f-stat: 
sd ratio≠1
Not 
Deceived Deceived
t-stat:
diff≠0
Levene 
test f-stat: 
sd ratio≠1
Not 
Deceived Deceived
t-stat:
diff≠0
Levene 
test f-stat: 
sd ratio≠1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Full Sample
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 14.584 14.923 -0.477 1.032 13.472 15.441 -2.029** 0.996 15.561 14.355 1.193 0.963
(0.484) (0.518) (0.676) (0.697) (0.658) (0.771)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 6.067 5.804 0.968 0.586** 6.171 5.867 0.732 0.660 5.975 5.731 0.685 0.514*
(0.156) (0.236) (0.254) (0.338) (0.191) (0.331)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.026 0.138 -2.537** 0.028 0.118 -1.461 0.024 0.161 -2.117**
(0.018) (0.043) (0.028) (0.056) (0.024) (0.067)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.653 0.677 -0.293 0.611 0.686 -0.651 0.692 0.667 0.223
(0.055) (0.058) (0.082) (0.080) (0.075) (0.088)
Number of Observations 77 65 36 34 41 31
Panel B:  Participants Played At Least 10 Prior Games in Laboratory
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 15.179 15.032 0.146 1.103 13.941 14.882 -0.674 0.967 16.136 15.214 0.630 1.055
(0.687) (0.734) (0.979) (0.996) (0.922) (1.125)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 6.211 5.923 0.659 0.487** 6.411 6.143 0.376 0.639 6.048 5.667 0.724 0.338**
(0.233) (0.404) (0.429) (0.592) (0.244) (0.555)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.026 0.133 -1.723* 0.000 0.125 -1.510 0.045 0.143 -1.017
(0.026) (0.063) (0.000) (0.085) (0.045) (0.097)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.684 0.700 -0.138 0.824 0.706 0.792 0.571 0.692 -0.689
(0.076) (0.085) (0.095) (0.114) (0.111) (0.133)
Number of Observations 39 31 17 17 22 14
Panel C:  Participants Played Fewer Than 10 Prior Games in Laboratory
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 13.974 14.824 -0.850 0.930 13.053 16.000 -2.154** 1.034 14.895 13.647 0.886 0.883
(0.675) (0.740) (0.947) (0.985) (0.939) (1.057)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 5.919 5.700 0.653 0.711 5.944 5.625 0.687 0.652 5.895 5.786 0.219 0.756
(0.206) (0.272) (0.286) (0.375) (0.305) (0.408)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.026 0.143 -1.828* 0.053 0.111 -0.637 0.000 0.176 -1.961*
(0.026) (0.060) (0.053) (0.076) (0.000) (0.095)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.622 0.657 -0.310 0.421 0.667 -1.504 0.833 0.647 1.252
(0.081) (0.081) (0.116) (0.114) (0.090) (0.119)
Number of Observations 38 35 19 18 19 17
Panel D:  Males
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 14.111 14.516 -0.349 1.272 13.818 14.214 -0.230 1.346 14.313 14.765 -0.280 1.227
(0.902) (0.746) (1.394) (1.065) (1.217) (1.066)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 5.703 5.393 0.694 0.714 5.545 5.545 0.000 0.742 5.813 5.294 0.938 0.683
(0.291) (0.339) (0.511) (0.593) (0.356) (0.418)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.000 0.097 -1.671 0.000 0.214 -1.661 0.000 0.000 NA
(0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.122) (0.000) (0.000)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.769 0.581 1.508 0.818 0.643 0.948 0.733 0.529 1.178
(0.084) (0.090) (0.122) (0.133) (0.118) (0.125)
Number of Observations 27 31 11 14 16 17
Panel E:  Females
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 14.840 15.294 -0.498 0.902 13.320 16.300 -2.532** 0.942 16.360 13.857 1.942* 0.715
(0.567) (0.725) (0.774) (0.936) (0.723) (1.143)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 6.271 6.214 0.170 0.534* 6.458 6.053 0.842 0.557 6.083 6.556 -1.063 0.632
(0.175) (0.314) (0.276) (0.415) (0.216) (0.444)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.040 0.176 -2.122** 0.040 0.050 -0.158 0.040 0.357 -2.829***
(0.028) (0.066) (0.040) (0.050) (0.040) (0.133)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.592 0.765 -1.645 0.520 0.714 -1.342 0.667 0.846 -1.163
(0.071) (0.074) (0.102) (0.101) (0.098) (0.104)
Number of Observations 50 34 25 20 25 14
Panel F: Non-'unlucky'
Amount Kept in Dictator Game 13.867 14.675 -0.912 0.976 13.593 15.043 -1.245 0.942 14.278 14.176 0.073 1.03
(0.604) (0.649) (0.779) (0.870) (0.976) (0.990)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles if Consistent) 6.091 5.480 1.803* 0.858 6.192 5.667 1.079 0.888 5.944 5.267 1.499 0.763
(0.213) (0.265) (0.304) (0.388) (0.286) (0.358)
Risk Aversion (Holt-Laury Gambles Switchers) 0.022 0.154 -2.214** 0.037 0.182 -1.679* 0.000 0.118 -1.504
(0.022) (0.059) (0.037) (0.084) (0.000) (0.081)
Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma 0.659 0.700 -0.397 0.630 0.652 -0.162 0.706 0.765 -0.378
(0.072) (0.073) (0.095) (0.102) (0.114) (0.106)
Number of Observations 45 40 27 23 18 17
the Full Sample; 21 for 'Not Deceived' and 13 for 'Deceived' in Player B. For Panel C, there are 37 for 'Deceived' in the Full Sample; 18 for 'Not Deceived' in Player B. For Panel D there are 26 for ‘Not Deceived’ in the Full Sample; 15 for ‘Not
Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel E there are 49 ‘Not Deceived’ in the Full Sample; 22 for ‘Not Deceived’ in Player A; 24 for ‘Not Deceived’ and 13 for ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel F there are 44 'Not Deceived' in the Full Sample; 17 for 'Not
Deceived' in Player B.
‘Deceived in Player A. For Panel E there are 48 ‘Not Deceived’ and 28 ‘Deceived’ in the Full Sample; 24 for ‘Not Deceived’ and 19 for ‘Deceived’ in Player A; 24 for ‘Not Deceived’ and 9 for ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel F there are 44 'Not
Deveived' and 33 'Deveived' in the Full Sample; 26 for 'Not Deceived' and 18 for 'Deceived' in Player A; 15 for 'Deceived' in Player B. For the dependent variable 'Risk Aversion, Switchers', the observation numbers change to the following: For
Panel B there are 30 ‘Deceived’ in the Full Sample, 16 ‘Deceived’ in Player A, and 21 ‘Not Deceived’ and 12 ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel C there are 17 ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel F there are 39 'Deceived' in the Full Sample; 22
'Deceived' in Player A. For the dependent Variable 'Defected in Prisoner's Dilemma', the observation numbers change to the following: For Panel A, there are 75 for 'Not Deceived' in the Full Sample; 35 for 'Deceived' in Player A; 39 for 'Not
Deceived' and 30 for 'Deceived' in Player B. For Panel B, there are 38 for 'Not Deceived' and 30 for ‘Deceived’ in 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Some observation numbers are different than those reported. For the dependent variable 'Proportion Kept in Dictator Game', the observation
numbers change to the following: For Panel C, there are 34 for 'Not Deceived' in the Full Sample; 17 for 'Not Deceived' in Player A. For the dependent variable 'Risk Aversion if Consistent', the observation numbers change to the following: For
Panel A there are 75 'Not Deceived' and 56 'Deceived' in the Full Sample; 35 for 'Not Deceived' and 30 for 'Deceived' in Player A and 40 for 'Not Deceived' and 26 for 'Deceived' in Player B. For Panel B, there are 38 'Not Deceived' and 26
'Deceived' in the Full Sample; 14 ‘Deceived’ in Player A; 21 ‘Not Deceived’ and 12 ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel C, there are 37 ‘Not Deceived’ and 30 ‘Deceived’ in the Full Sample; 18 for ‘Not Deceived’ and 16 for ‘Deceived’ in Player A; 14
for ‘Deceived’ in Player B. For Panel D there are 28 ‘Deceived’ in the Full Sample; 11 for 
Table 3: Effect of Deception in Round One on Behavior in Round Two Games
Mean and Standard Errors
Full Sample
Player A 
in Round One
Player B 
in Round OneScreen
1 9/10 of $8.80 1/10 of $11.00 9/10 of $0.55 1/10 of $21.20
2 8/10 of $8.80 2/10 of $11.00 8/10 of $0.55 2/10 of $21.20
3 7/10 of $8.80 3/10 of $11.00 7/10 of $0.55 3/10 of $21.20
4 6/10 of $8.80 4/10 of $11.00 6/10 of $0.55 4/10 of $21.20
5 5/10 of $8.80 5/10 of $11.00 5/10 of $0.55 5/10 of $21.20
6 4/10 of $8.80 6/10 of $11.00 4/10 of $0.55 6/10 of $21.20
7 3/10 of $8.80 7/10 of $11.00 3/10 of $0.55 7/10 of $21.20
8 2/10 of $8.80 8/10 of $11.00 2/10 of $0.55 8/10 of $21.20
9 1/10 of $8.80 9/10 of $11.00 1/10 of $0.55 9/10 of $21.20
10 0/10 of $8.80 10/10 of $11.00 0/10 of $0.55 10/10 of $21.20
The respondents were presented with the above choices in sequence, starting with
the first choice shown in Screen 1, and ending with the choice in Screen 2. We
record in our analysis whether individuals (a) were consistent in their answers, and
(b) if they were consistent, at what point they switch from Option A to Option B.
Option A Option B
Appendix Table A: Holt-Laury Risky Lottery 